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THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULE 501,
KLAXON AND THE CONSTITUTION
David E. Seidelson*
Rule 501 of the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
2
and Magistrates' provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However,
in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
It is clear from the second sentence of the Rule that, in diversity
cases, 3 federal courts are to resolve privilege issues by the applica* Professor of Law, George Washington University. LL.B., University of Pittsburgh,

1956. Member of the bar, Supreme Court of the United States; Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Former member of the District of Columbia Circuit Committee on the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts and Magistrates and the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia Committee on the Proposed Rules of Evidence for
United States District Courts and Magistrates.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDENCE 101-1103 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FED.
R. EvID.].

2. FED. R. EvID. 501 (emphasis added).
3. I have used the phrase "diversity cases" because it is easier to express and comprehend than "civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision" and because it is in diversity cases
that the second sentence of the rule will have its principal application.
In civil actions and proceedings, the House bill provides that state privilege law
applies "to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision." The Senate bill provides that "in civil actions and proceedings
arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or 28 U.S.C. § 1335, or between citizens of
different states and removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof is determined
in accordance with State law, unless with respect to the particular claim or
defense, Federal law supplies the rule of decision."
The wording of the House and Senate bills differs in the treatment of civil
actions and proceedings. The rule in the House bill applies to evidence that
relates to "an element of a claim or defense." If an item of proof tends to support
or defeat a claim or defense, or an element of a claim or defense, and if state
law supplies the rule of decision for that claim or defense, then state privilege
law applies to that item of proof.
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tion of state law. What is not entirely clear is, given a choice-oflaw problem applicable to the privilege issue, which state's law
is the federal court to apply? Does the Rule require the federal
court to resolve the choice-of-law problem as it would be resolved
by the highest appellate court of the state in which the federal
district court sits, and apply that state privilege law which that
court would apply, or does the Rule permit the federal district
court to resolve the choice-of-law problem independently and
apply that state privilege law which seems most appropriate to
the federal district court? Put another way, does Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric ManufacturingCo.4 govern the determination of
a choice-of-law privilege issue under the second sentence of Rule
501?
Let's create a hypothetical situation 5 which will, simultaneously, isolate the problem and present the alternatives. P sues D
to recover for personal injuries sustained in a two-vehicle collision
which occurred in State A.' The action is initiated in a federal
district court sitting in State A and exercising diversity jurisdiction. During the defense case, W, a psychologist, is called to the
stand. In response to P's request for a side-bar offer of proof, D
makes the following assertions to the court: As a result of the
injuries he sustained, P was admitted to a rehabilitation center
in State B. 7 At the time of admission, P was interviewed by W,
in her capacity as psychologist for the center, for the purpose of
assigning P to an appropriate rehabilitation group. During the
course of that interview, P "assumed responsibility for the
[collision, stating] that he lost control of the vehicle he was
Under the provision in the House bill, therefore, state privilege law will
usually apply in diversity cases. There may be diversity cases, however, where
a claim or defense is based upon federal law. In such instances, federal privilege
law will apply to evidence relevant to the federal claim or defense. See Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
In civil actions and proceedings, where the rule of decision as to a claim or
defense or as to an element of a claim or defense is supplied by state law, the
House provision requires that state privilege law apply.
The Conference adopts the House provision.
CONFERENCE COMM. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1974) [accompanying H.R.
5463, the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE].
4. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See text accompanying
note 29 infra.
5. The hypothetical is based on Elliott v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90 (7th Cir.
1969).
6. In Elliott, the collision occurred in Indiana and the action was brought in a federal
district court in Indiana. Id. at 90-91.
7. In Elliott, the rehabilitation center was in Illinois. Id. at 93.
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driving and ran into [D's vehicle]." ' That assumption of responsibility by P was relevant to W's purpose of assigning P to an
appropriate rehabilitation group?
State A, in which the federal court sits, has no psychologistpatient privilege.' 0 State B, where the interview was conducted
and the rehabilitation process effected, has a psychologist-patient
privilege" apparently applicable to P's inculpatory declaration to
W. The highest appellate court of State A has embraced interest
analysis'" as the method employed for resolving choice-of-law
8. Id.
9. I have made this conclusion a part of the hypothetical to assure the potential
applicability of the psychologist-patient privilege.
10. Plaintiff relies in part on the portion of Sec. 2-1714, Bums' Ind. Stat.
which makes physicians incompetent to testify as to matter communicated to
them by patients in the course of their professional business. The collision and
the trial occurred in Indiana. Plaintiff cites no authority, however, that
"physician" in that statute includes "psychologist."
Elliott v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90, 93 (7th Cir. 1969). The court considered as
well an Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 51, § 5.2 (1963), privileging communications
to a psychologist acting under the supervision of a psychiatrist. But, finding insufficient
evidence that the psychologist-witness had been acting under the supervision of a psychiatrist, the court rejected that statute as well. Elliott v. Watkins Trucking Co., supra.
After the operative facts of Elliott occurred, Indiana enacted a psychologist-patient
privilege statute:
No psychologist certified under the provisions of this act. . . shall disclose
any information he may have acquired from persons with whom he has dealt in
his professional capacity, except under the following circumstances: (1) in trials
for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of said homicide; (2) in proceedings the purpose of which is to
determine mental competency, or in which a defense of mental incompetency
is raised; (3) in actions, civil or criminal, against a psychologist for malpractice;
(4) upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will of a client; and (5)
with the expressed consent of the client or subject, or in the case of his death or
disability, of his legal representative.
IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 25, § 33-1-17 (1969).

11. No psychologist shall disclose any information he may have acquired from
persons consulting him in his professional capacity, necessary to enable him to
render services in his professional capacity, to such persons except only:
(1) in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or
immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in all proceedings the purpose of
which is to determine mental competency, or in which a defense of mental
incapacity is raised, (3) in actions, civil or criminal, against the psychologist for
malpractice, (4) with the expressed consent of the client, or in the case of his
death or disability, of his personal representative or other person authorized to
sue or of the beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life, health or physical
condition, or (5) upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will of a
client.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 406 (1966). Plaintiff did "not rely on ch. 911/2, sec. 406." Elliott
v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90, 93 n.4.
12. In Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965), the court, exercising
diversity jurisdiction, concluded that the Supreme Court of Indiana (the forum state)
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problems and, confronted with a similar case in the recent past,
determined that the state in which the professional relationship
was based had the most significant interest in deciding whether
or not that relationship should be privileged. Therefore it applied
the dispositive law'3 of that state. Were the present case laid
before the highest appellate court of State A, that court would
apply State B's psychologist-patient privilege. Relying on that
precedent and its application to the present case, P objects to the
offered testimony of W on the basis of State B's psychologistpatient privilege. D asserts that the federal district court is free
to resolve the choice-of-law problem for itself and that the appropriate resolution would lead to the application of State A's dispositive law, which contains no privilege. Does Rule 501 require the
court to apply the dispositive law of State B, as the highest appellate court of State A would, or does it permit the court to make
an independent resolution of the choice-of-law problem, followed
by the possible application of State A's dispositive law which
contains no applicable privilege?
Perhaps one of the most surprising elements of this problem
is that it continues to be without definitive resolution. As long ago
as 1970, it was characterized as being "among the most difficult
questions a federal judge can be called upon to answer."' 4 Taking
would reject the mechanical application of lex loci delicti in all tort actions and, instead,
utilize interest analysis; therefore, the diversity court, cognizant of its Klaxon obligation,
did just that. The Watts prediction as to the course Indiana's state courts would take
seems to have been an accurate one. In Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind. App. 655, 237
N.E.2d 116 (1968), the court stated: "We believe the more logical basis for a choice of
conflicting law could be stated: Given a factual and legal situation, involving an actual
conflict of law, which state has the greaterinterest in having its law applied?" Id. at 670,
237 N.E.2d at 124. But see Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind. App. 203, 208, 264 N.E.2d 328,
332 (1970) in which the court applied the Indiana statute of limitations, notwithstanding
a "Grouping of Contacts" argument aimed at the nonapplication of the forum's limitations statute. For a case in which an interest analysis jurisdiction concluded that that
methodology should be employed to resolve a choice-of-law problem as to the applicable
statute of limitations see Cornwell v. CIT Corp., 373 F. Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1974).
13. The phrase "dispositive law" is intended to refer to "those rules of law which are
used to determine the nature of rights arising from a fact group, i.e., those which dispose
of a claim." Taintor, Foreign Judgment in Rem: Full Faithand Credit v. Res Judicatain
Personam, 8 U. Pirr. L. REV. 223, 233 n.58 (1942). I find the phrase "dispositive law" more
descriptive and useful than such phrases as "local law," "internal law" or "municipal
law."
In Elliott, the court seems never to have made a specific choice-of-law decision.
Instead, it simply determined that neither of the privilege statutes (one of Indiana, one
of Illinois) asserted by the plaimtiff was applicable. Elliott v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406
F.2d 90, 93 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. Note, Privilege in FederalDiversity Cases, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 861 (1970).
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into account the number of cases involving significant constitu-

tional issues presented to the Supreme Court each year, the absence of definitive judicial resolution is explicable. What may be
more difficult to explain is the absence of explicit resolution in
the new Federal Rules of Evidence. That failure seems somewhat
more remarkable after examining the history of Rule 501.
In their original proposed form, the Federal Rules of
Evidence contained thirteen rules in Article V.' 5 Rules 502
through 510 created a series of privileges cognizable in federal
court.'" Rules 511 and 512 dealt with waivers of privilege. 17 Rule
513 provided for the assertion of privileges without jury knowledge and for an ameliorating jury instruction upon request."5 Proposed Rule 501 read:'9
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as

provided in these rules or other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court, no person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any
matter or producing any object or writing.

The proposed rule, and particularly the italicized portion, would
have had the federal rules govern privilege issues in all federal
court litigation, federal causes of action and diversity cases. That
proposal was the product of the conclusions of the Advisory Committee:10
15. PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 243 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PROP. R. EVID.,
with reference to a specific rule where appropriate].
16. The privileges fashioned were: reports privileged by statute, PROP. R. EvID. 502;
lawyer-client, PROP. R. EVID. 503; psychotherapist-patient, PROP. R. EVID. 504; husbandwife, PROP. R. EvID. 505; communications to clergymen, PROP. R. EvID. 506; political vote,
PROP. R. EVID. 507; trade secrets, PROP R. EVID. 508; secrets of state, PROP. R. EviD. 509;
and identity of informer, PROP. R. EvID. 510.
17. PROP. R. EvID. 511 provided for voluntary waiver and PROP. R. EVID. 512 preserved
the privilege where "disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the privilege."
18. "The claim of a privilege ...
is not a proper subject of comment by judge or
counsel . . . ." PROP. R. EviD. 513(a). "In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to
the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege outside the
presence of the jury." PROP. R. EVID. 513(b). "Upon request, any party against whom the
jury might draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction
that no inference may be drawn therefrom." PROP. R. EVID. 513(c).
19. PROP. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).
20. PROP. R. EvID. 501, Advisory Comm's. Note. For a tour de force on the constitu-
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Regardless of what might once have been thought to be the
command of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817,
82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), as to observance of state created privileges
in diversity cases, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136,
14 L.Ed. 2d 8 (1965), is believed to locate the problem in the
area of choice rather than necessity.
The Committee also stated:'
The appearance of privilege in the case is quite by accident, and
its effect is to block off the tribunal from a source of information.
Thus its real impact is on the method of proof in the case, and
in comparison any substantive impact appears tenuous.
In rejecting the totality of proposed Article V and supplanting it with the present Rule 501, the House Committee on the
Judiciary reported:"
The [House Committee's amendment] is designed to require
the application of State privilege law in civil actions and proceedings governed by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. .

.

. The Com-

mittee deemed the proviso to be necessary in the light of the
Advisory Committee's view .

.

. that this result is not

mandated under Erie.
The rationale underlying the proviso is that federal law
should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas
such as privilege absent a compelling reason. The Committee
believes that in civil cases in the federal courts where an element
of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a federal question,
there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure
from State policy. In addition, the Committee considered that
the Court's proposed Article V would have promoted forum
shopping in some civil actions, depending upon differences in
the privilege law applied as among the State and federal courts.
The Committee's proviso, on the other hand, under which the
federal courts are bound to apply the State's privilege law in
actions founded upon a State-created right or defense, removes
the incentive to "shop."
Thus the House Judiciary Committee determined that in
diversity cases (1) questions of privilege were "substantive" and,
tional and statutory propriety of that conclusion see Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie,
87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974).
21. PROP. R. EVID. 501, Advisory Comm's Note as amended.
22. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1976)
[accompanying H.R. 5463, the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE] [hereinafter cited as H.
COMM. JUD. REP. with reference to specific pages where appropriate].
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therefore, should be governed by Erie, whether or not that conclusion was "mandated under Erie," and (2) such a decision would
diminish the likelihood of forum shopping "among the State and
federal courts."
Quite obviously, both the Advisory Committee, which
drafted the proposed rules, and the House Judiciary Committee,
which so significantly amended Article V, devoted substantial
time and intellectual effort to their conflicting determinations of
whether or not Erie should be deemed applicable to privilege
issues. Given the Advisory Committee's conclusion that Erie was
not mandated and should not be utilized electively (a determination in which I would not acquiesce), its failure to consider the
applicability of Klaxon was entirely consistent and rational.
However, the failure of the House Judiciary Committee, once
having determined that Erie should be utilized, to determine
explicitly the applicablility of Klaxon seems, on the surface at
least,u to have been unfortunate. At the very least, it compels one
to examine the Judiciary Committee's Report for evidence of a
legislative intent implying some resolution to the problem.
If, as its language indicates, the House Judiciary Committee
was desirous of "remov[ing] the incentive to 'shop' ",24 as between a state court and a federal court sitting in that state and
capable of exercising diversity jurisdiction, the Committee's report should be read as implying the applicability of Klaxon. If
Klaxon were deemed inapplicable, and the federal court free to
resolve the choice-of-law problem independently, the ultimate
result of that independent resolution could well be a determination different from that of the highest appellate state court. In the
hypothetical under consideration, for example, the federal court
would be free to apply the dispositive law of State A, which contains no psychologist-patient privilege, and receive the offered
testimony over P's objection, in spite of the contrary conclusion
which would be achieved by the highest appellate court of State
A. That would certainly tend to stimulate the forum shopping
intended to be discouraged by the House Judiciary Committee.
Assuming that counsel for the litigants contemplated the potentially inconsistent results which might be achieved by the two
courts, P would be inclined to initiate the action in the state court
of State A and D would be encouraged to remove it to the federal
23. The explanation for this apparent "oversight" may very well be the constitutional
overtones which attach to this issue. See text accompanying note 94 infra.
24. H. COMM.JUD. REP. 9.
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court on diversity grounds?2 Were the inconsistent results reversed, so that the State A court would receive W's testimony and
the federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction reject it, P
would be encouraged to initiate the action in the federal court"0
and D would be bound by that decision.? In order to eliminate
that incentive for forum shopping as between state and federal
courts in diversity cases, it is necessary that the choice-of-law
resolution of the state court be made binding on the federal court
through the application of Klaxon.
In addition to expressing a desire to discourage forum shopping in diversity cases, the House Judiciary Committee Report
explicitly characterized privilege issues as falling within "substantive areas" in which "federal law should not supersede that
of the States. . .

."2

While that "substantive" characterization

was made specifically for Erie purposes and without explicit examination of the applicability of Klaxon, the former conclusion
impels an affirmative response to the latter inquiry. In Klaxon,
the Court stated:"
We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins.

.

. against such independent determi-

nations by the federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of
laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court
[exercising diversity jurisdiction] in Delaware must conform to
those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal
administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts
sitting side by side. .

.

. Any other ruling would do violence to

the principle of uniformity within a state upon which the Tompkins decision is based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may
produce between federal courts in different states is attributable
to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies
diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal
courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent
"general law" of conflict of laws. Subject only to review by this
Court on any federal question that may arise, Delaware is free
to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948).
26. Id. § 1332.

27. The conclusion stated in the text is based on the assumption that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate.
28. H. COMM. JuD. REP. 9.
29. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
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law of the forum or some other law. . . This Court's views are
not the decisive factor in determining the applicable conflicts
rule. .... And the proper function of the Delaware federal court
is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be.
That excerpted language indicates that, when an issue is substantive for Erie purposes, the federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction and confronted with a choice-of-law problem as to that
substantive issue must resolve the choice-of-law problem as it
would be resolved by the highest appellate court of the state in
which the federal court sits and apply that dispositive law which
would be applied by that highest appellate state court. Thus, in
the hypothetical under consideration, the federal court, utilizing
the indicative law and precedent of State A, should apply the
psychologist-patient privilege of State B.
In the same factual setting, how should the federal court
react to the choice-of-law problem if the highest appellate court
of State A, while having embraced interest analysis, has not heretofore resolved the specific choice-of-law problem presented? The
answer seems obvious as a matter of logic, common sense and
precedent. The federal court should make an "educated judicial
guess"3 as to how the highest appellate court of State A, utilizing
interest analysis, would resolve the choice-of-law problem and
apply that dispositive law indicated by such a resolution.',
So far, so good, and, incidentally, not very difficult, especially in light of the earlier characterization of the problem as
''among the most difficult questions a federal judge can be called
upon to answer."3 Of course, the author of that characterization
did not have the House Judiciary Committee Report on the new
Federal Rules of Evidence from which to infer an answer to the
question. Moreover, by changing our hypothetical situation and
the judicial context, we can make the problem considerably more
complex and difficult to resolve, notwithstanding the present
availability of that Committee Report. Application of Cepeda3 3
30. The Sixth Circuit, finding itself confronted with a diversity case in which the law
of the forum state (Michigan) was uncertain, was candid enough to use similar language:
"Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, . . . it is our obligation to make a considered
'educated guess' as to what decision would be reached by the Supreme Court of Michigan
.... " Ann Arbor Trust Co. v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 527 F.2d 526, 527
(6th Cir. 1975).
31. See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
32. See note 14 supra.
33. 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
It would appear, from the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case
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presents an ideal factual and judicial context in which to confront
the problem.
Orlando Cepeda, then "a member of the San Francisco
Giants baseball team,"34 brought a libel action against Cowles
Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc. The allegedly defamatory article had been written by Timothy Cohane and published in the
"defendant's bi-weekly magazine, LOOK."" Plaintiff initiated
the action "in the Superior Court of the State of California, in
San Francisco"3 and defendant "removed

.

.

on the ground of

diversity of citizenship, to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California, Southern Division."3 The
federal district court in California "entered an order directing
plaintiff to commence taking the deposition of Cohane . . . in
New York City, pursuant to a stipulation entered into between
the parties."38 During the course of the deposition, Cohane was
asked and refused to answer questions as to the identity of team
officials who were the purported sources of certain statements in
the article. "The reason set forth by Cohane for his refusal to
answer was that 'this [information] was given to me under the
tacit understanding that it was privileged information, that the
source would never be revealed.' " Plaintiff sought an order from
a federal district court judge in New York directing Cohane to
answer.
California had a newsman's privilege statute4" and New York
[Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. Week 3123 (Oct. 13, 1964)] that the [California]
District Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the article was not libelous per se, plaintiff having stipulated that he would
not amend his complaint to allege special damages. On appeal, the decision was
reversed, the Court of Appeals holding that the article was libelous per se and
remanding the case to the District Court for a trial of the issues, to wit, whether
the Giant officials, to whom Cohane ascribes certain statements, did, in fact,
make such statements-this bearing on the issue of damages (328 F.2d at 871)
and on the defense of truth.
Id. at 466.
34. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869, 870 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844 (1964).
35. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
36. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869, 870 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844 (1964).
37. Id.
38. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
39. Id.
40. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1881 (1935). See Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465,
471 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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did not.4 ' The primary issue presented to the federal district court
in New York was which state's dispositive law was applicable.
The court recognized that the privilege issue was substantive for
Erie purposes42 and concluded that Klaxon was applicable.4 3 The
federal district court was to resolve the choice-of-law problem by
the application of state indicative law.44 But which state's indicative law was to be used, that of California, "the place of trial,"45
or New York, "the place of deposition"?" The federal court concluded that New York's indicative law governed the choice-of-law
problem. In examining and analyzing the New York state court
opinions, the federal court concluded that a New York court confronted with this choice-of-law problem would apply the dispositive law of the place of trial (California), unless the privilege
asserted was one recognized at the place of deposition (New
York), in which case the court would apply the dispositive law of
the place of deposition.47 Since the asserted privilege was not
recognized in New York, the place of deposition, the federal court
concluded that the applicable dispositive law was that of California, the place of trial. Consequently, the California newsman's
privilege statute was potentially available to the deponent
Cohane. After examining the statute and California decisions,
however, the federal court concluded that "Cohane, a journalist
working on a bi-weekly periodical, is not covered by the statute."4 Therefore, Cohane was ordered to answer the challenged
questions.
If the court's ultimate conclusion that the deponent was not
covered by the California statute is put aside, there is a surface
congeniality to the court's (New York determined) resolution of
the choice-of-law problem. As read by the federal court, New
41. "[The place of trial, namely, California, recognizes a privilege in this area,
whereas New York, the place of deposition, does not." Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp.
465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
42. Id. at 467.
43. Id. at 469-70.
44. The phrase "indicative law" is intended to refer to "those rules which indicate
the system of dispositive rules which is to be applied." Taintor, supra note 13. I find the
phrase "indicative law" simpler and no less descriptive than such phrases as "conflict-oflaw laws," "conflict-of-law rules" or "conflicts rules." I am indebted to the late Dean
Charles W. Taintor H for his fashioning of the phrases "indicative law" and "dispositive
law."
45. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 469-70.
48. Id. at 472.
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York's indicative law seems to assure the utilization of a potentially applicable privilege, whether it exists in the dispositive law
of the place of trial or in the dispositive law of the place of deposition. That apparent assurance that an applicable privilege will
not "slip through the cracks" simply because the deposition is
taken in one state and the trial is in another is comforting. To one
sympathetically inclined toward the use of interest analysis to
resolve choice-of-law problems (as I am),4" it is even more reassuring to have the federal court corroborate the New York indicative
law conclusion that California's dispositive law was applicable by
noting that "the State of California is the state with the strongest
interest in, and the most contacts with, the pending cause of
action."5 What is a bit discomfiting is the court's identification
of that interest and those contacts of California: "It is the residence of the plaintiff and the place where the cause of action is
pending."'" And there is only little consolation to be had in the
court's manner of diminishing the significance of New York's
concern: "New York, aside from being the place of deposition and
perhaps the residence of the witness, does not have the same
interest in, or contacts with, the controversy, and as such its
[dispositive] law should not apply."52 There seems to be some
absence of a sharply focused examination of the specific issue
presented in that judicial demonstration of the superiority of California's interest in the choice-of-law problem. That absence is
wholly explicable in terms of the date of the opinion and the then
just emerging interest analysis methodology. 3 In the intervening
years, a long line of judicial opinions54 and scholarly works"5 ex49. See, e.g., Seidelson, Interest Analysis: For Those Who Like It and Those Who
Don't, 11 DuQ. L. REv. 283 (1973); Seidelson, Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree
of Specificity: The Wrongful Death Action, 10 DUQ. L. REv. 525 (1972); Seidelson,
Comment on Cipollav. Shaposka, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 423 (1971); Seidelson, TheAmericanization of Renvoi, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 201 (1969).
50. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.DN.Y. 1964).
51. Id.
52. Id.

53. The only interest analysis opinion of a court, state or federal, cited in Cepeda is
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912
(1963). Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
54. E. SCOLES & R. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFUCT OF LAWS 464 (2d
ed. 1972), lists seven cases in the New York courts alone, both state and federal, from 1963
(Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743) through 1969
(Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519) which utilized
interest analysis. Since the publication date of that casebook, at least two significant cases
utilizing interest analysis have been decided in New York: Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d
438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Neumeier v. Keuhner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286
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plaining and applying that methodology should make it possible
for us to undertake a somewhat more refined examination of the
interests involved.
Such an examination virtually compels the conclusion that
the state in which the assertedly privileged relationship was entered and exclusively sited should be deemed to have the most
significant interest in determining whether or not that relationship is privileged. To the extent that the parties to the relationship contemplated the application of any law to that relationship,
they presumably contemplated the application (and potential
protection) of the dispositive law of the state in which they entered the relationship and where the relationship was exclusively
based. That presumed expectation of the parties should not be
frustrated, either by some plaintiff's choice of forum or by some
court's choice of deposition state. Even if no contemplation of law
is imputed to the parties at the time they entered the
relationship, application of the dispositive law of the state in
which the relationship existed continues to commend itself. So
long as that dispositive law is applied, that state's interest in
regulating the relationship (either by encouraging those within
the state to enter such a relationship because it is privileged or
by alerting those within the state that perhaps such a relationship should be eschewed because it is not privileged) would not
be frustrated. Presumably, the state in which the relationship is
entered and exclusively exists has determined the extent of favor
with which it views such relationships, and that determination
will be manifested by that state's dispositive law which extends
to or withholds a privilege from such relationships. "State legislatures create privileges because a particular relationship is considered so valuable to society that it should be fostered by preserving
the confidentiality of the relationship even though evidence
which might aid in the quest for truth will be lost."56 A state's
NE.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). For a Symposium on Neumeier see 1 HOFSTRA L. REV.
94 (1973).
55. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 226 (1971).
After Babcock and Griffith [v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964)] lighted the way, other courts rushed to follow. In a short time, the
District of Columbia and at least 21 states have rejected the place-of-wrong rule
in some context, usually in a court decision revealing general acceptance of the
premises of state-interest analysis.
Id. at 234 (jurisdictions, cases and citations are set forth in n.36 to WNTRAUB'S text). See
also D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 139 (1965); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW 233 (1968).
56. Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1972). In Baylor,
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decision to extend (or withhold) a privilege with regard to a relationship existing exclusively within that state should not be disregarded by any other state, whether forum or deposition state.
Finally, it should be noted that those most likely to enter into
such a relationship in the state, and thereby become affected by
that state's view as to whether and to what extent the relationship should be privileged, are citizens of the state. As citizens and
potential electors, they have the capacity to influence the state's
view of that relationship. That unique capacity does not exist on
their part in a forum or deposition state other than their home
state. Consequently, a judicial conclusion that the privileged nature of the relationship entered and existing exclusively in one
state should be determined by the application of the dispositive
law of some other state would frustrate (1) the potential expectations of the parties to the relationship, (2) the interest of the situs
state in regulating the relationship and (3) the political capacity
of citizens of the situs state to determine the nature of the relationship in that state.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, bearing in mind the date
of the case, the court's opinion in Cepeda does not explicitly
indicate the state in which the relationships between Cohane and
the team officials of the San Francisco Giants existed. It may be
appropriate to assume, given the stated facts of the case, that
Cohane's interviews with those team officials occurred in California. Given that assumption, California would be the state with
the most significant interests in determining whether or not the
relationships between newsman and sources were privileged.
Mindful that the federal court's conclusion that California's dispositive law applied was a product of that court's reading of New
York's indicative law, it is appropriate to consider what conclusion the court might have achieved had New York's indicative
law been different.
Let's assume that, in a case like Cepeda, New York's indicative law pointed to the application of the dispositive law of the
state in which the deposition was being taken. New York's dispositive law contained no newsman's privilege; therefore Cohane's
however, the court concluded that a state accountant-client privilege was not available
in a federal cause of action. The constitutional propriety of a refusal to recognize a statecreated privilege in a federal cause of action (now codified in the first sentence of FED. R.
EvID. 501) is beyond the scope of this article. For an opinion holding a state accountantclient privilege applicable in a diversity case see Lukee Enterprises, Inc. v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 52 F.R.D. 21 (N.M. 1971).
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assertion of privilege would have been rejected out of hand.
Clearly, that would frustrate the potential expectations of the
parties to the California interviews, California's capacity to regulate such relationships existing exclusively in that state, and the
political capacity of California citizens to help shape the mode of
such regulation. What countervailing interest of New York would
be served by resolving the privilege issue by the application of
New York's dispositive law? The only interest of the deposition
state would seem to be that of assuring the efficacy of orders of
its courts related to the deposition. It could be asserted, of course,
that the application of New York's dispositive law, containing no
newsman's privilege, would serve precisely that interest since it
would lead inexorably to the conclusion that the New York court
could order the deponent to answer the challenged questions. But
there are two troubling and intimately related aspects of such an
assertion. First, the mere fact that New York is the deposition
state does not require or justify the conclusion that its interests
are best served by an affirmative court order, that is, one requiring the deponent to answer. New York's interests can be discerned only by precisely identifying the specific issue before the
court, examining the conflicting dispositive laws of California and
New York, determining the reasons underlying each of those dispositive laws and deciding which, if any, of those reasons convert
into legitimate interests on the part of each state in having its
dispositive law apply. Second, the interests of New York, so determined, may be so patently inferior to those of California that
the application of New York's dispositive law would be manifestly
inappropriate.
We have already identified California's interests in having its
dispositive law applied. What are the interests of New York as
deposition state? Its dispositive law contains no newsman's privilege. Presumably, that is the result of a New York determination
that the relationship between newsman and source neither requires nor justifies a privileged status. That New York determination was made with principal concern focused upon such relationships in that state. Since, by hypothesis, the relationship before
the court existed exclusively in California, the reason underlying
New York's dispositive law does not convert into a New York
interest in having its dispositive law applied. There may be another (and, I would suggest, secondary) reason for New York's
dispositive law containing no newsman's privilege. New York
may have determined that the integrity of its judicial process
requires the availability as potential evidence of all information
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secured by newsmen. Does that reason convert into a significant
interest on the part of New York in having its dispositive law
applied when New York is the deposition state?
The role of the court in the deposition state is, in essence,
ancillary to the role of the trial court. The taking of the deposition
in some state other than the forum is generally the product of a
decision of convenience by the trial court, as it apparently was
in Cepeda where "the deposition of Cohane [was taken] in New
York City, pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the
parties."57 The integrity of the judicial process in the deposition
state would seem to be preserved and protected completely so
long as the deposition is conducted in a manner consonant with
any orders entered by the court in that state. And it would appear
that that complete preservation and protection would exist
whether the court directed the deponent to answer, or accepted
his asserted privilege. The court in the deposition state has no
inherent or self-serving need for the information sought by the
litigant taking the deposition. Consequently, the integrity of the
judicial process in the deposition state does not require the application of the dispositive law of that state. Indeed, the application
of that state's dispositive law to determine an asserted privilege
in circumstances in which the arguably privileged relationship
had been entered and existed exclusively in some other state
would be, at best, the product of a painfully inept application of
interest analysis.
If we may, temporarily and only hypothetically, impute such
an inept choice-of-law resolution to the New York Court of Appeals, what would be the effect on the decision of the federal
district court sitting in New York in Cepeda? Since the federal
court concluded that New York's indicative law would be determinative in resolving the choice-of-law problem, that painfully
inept conclusion that New York's dispositive law applied would
be controlling. Or would it?
The obligation of a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits has
traditionally been limited by this caveat: unless that substantive
law is violative of the Constitution. That limitation applies
57. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
58. Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). See the dissent of Justice Lumbard in Rosenthal v. Warren,
475 F.2d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 1973). Although I do not agree with Judge Lumbard's conclusion
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whether the state law which violates the Constitution is dispositive or indicative. 9 Consequently, if the hypothetical New York
indicative law which requires the application of the dispositive
law of the deposition state (New York) is not only painfully inept
but unconstitutional as well, the federal court sitting in New York
will not be required (or even permitted) to utilize it. Can that
indicative law and the result it produces be characterized as unconstitutional? If our earlier conclusion that New York, as deposition state, has no interest in the privilege issue is correct, an
indicative law pointing to the dispositive law of New York would
resolve that issue by the application of the dispositive law of a
state lacking any interest in the issue, and would, for that reason,
violate the due process 0 rights of the party adversely affected by
that conclusion." Moreover, the application of New York's dispositive law by a court sitting in New York to an issue in which New
York has no legitimate interest would violate the full faith and
credit" mandate to utilize the dispositive law of that sister state
having exclusive legitimate interests in the issue, 3 i.e., the state
that application of New York's (rather than Massachusetts') dispositive law in Rosenthal
was unconstitutional, I believe his opinion demonstrates the existence of constitutional
restraints upon a purely mechanical application of either Erie or Klaxon.
59. See note 58 supra.
60. "Nor shall any person. . . be deprived of. . . property, without due process of
....
." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "Nor shall any state deprive any person of . . .
property, without due process of law ....
" U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. Because we are

law

examining federal and state court choice-of-law resolutions, both due process clauses are
cited.
61. See LEFLAR, supra note 55, where the author states:

The substantive law of a state which has no substantial connection with a set
of facts may not be applied to govern those facts. The cases already discussed
in this chapter are representative and whatever general conclusions are drawn
from them may be assumed to be broadly applicable to choice of law in torts,
property, and other private law fields as well. Determination of property claims
by a law which has no substantial connection with the facts would be unconstitutional. Although there is more room for argument about tort claims, the same
conclusion must be reached as to them and as to any other type of substantive
private claim (or defense) that anyone might assert.
Id. at 134 (footnotes omitted). See also R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 55, at 378; Martin,
ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976).
62. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. For the "implementing" legislation see 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1958). For discussions of the scope of the full faith and credit clause see
Seidelson, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: An Instrument for Resolution of Intranational Conflicts Problems, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 554 (1964); Seidelson, Full Faith and
Credit: A Modest Proposal. . . Or Two, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 462 (1962).
63. See LEFLAR, supra note 55; WEINTRAUB, supra note 55, at 399; Martin, supra note
61; Seidelson, supra note 62.
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in which the relationship exclusively existed. Consequently, both
the due process and full faith and credit clauses would preclude
the application of New York's dispositive law by a New York state
court or a federal district court exercising diversity jurisdiction
and sitting as deposition court in New York.
We have concluded, therefore, that if the indicative law of
the deposition state refers to the dispositive law of that state,
containing no newsman's privilege, when the only contact which
the state has with the case is that it is the deposition state, such
a choice-of-law resolution would be inept and constitutionally
impermissible. Because of its unconstitutionality, that choice-oflaw resolution would be neither binding upon, nor available to, a
federal district court exercising diversity jurisdiction (ancillary to
that of another federal district trial court) and sitting in the deposition state. Thus, if the federal court in New York in Cepeda had
found that New York's indicative law pointed to New York's dispositive law, application of that dispositive law would have been
constitutionally impermissible, therefore neither required nor
permitted by Klaxon.
Would that conclusion of unconstitutionality be appropriate
if, in Cepeda, (1) New York had a newsman's privilege statute
and (2) California did not? The (New York) federal court's reading of New York's indicative law was that in such circumstances
it would refer to New York's dispositive law, so that New York's
privilege would have been potentially available to the deponent.
To determine the constitutionality of that result, it is necessary
to determine if New York as deposition state would have an interest in the asserted privilege issue sufficient to justify the application of its dispositive law. The language of the federal court's
opinion laid the foundation for such a determination and began
pointing towards its resolution: 4
In looking to New York law, I find that as a general principle
the law of the place where the testimony is to be heard [the trial
state] governs its admissibility. .

.

. The only cases in New

York presenting the specific questions of the validity and scope
of a privilege asserted at the deposition state arose in the context
of recognition in the deposition state and either non-recognition
or different scope in the trial state. . . . Those cases, in disregarding the general rule . . ., applied the law of the deposition

state, recognizing the privilege and defining its scope. In doing
64. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citations omitted).
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so they abided by the well-established doctrine that a state may
refuse to apply the law of a sister state when the forum (deposition state) has contacts with the cause of action and has a fundamental policy not in accord with the law of the sister state
(trial state).
We must determine if the deposition state (New York) would
have "contacts with the cause of action"'6 5 in Cepeda sufficient to
justify the application of its own (hypothetical) dispositive law
containing a newsman's privilege.66
Assuming New York to have a newsman's privilege, what
interest would that give New York in the application of its privilege law where New York is simply the deposition state? Presumably, that newsman's privilege would exist primarily as the result
of a New York determination that the relationship between newsman and source should be privileged. That determination would
be aimed at protecting those newsman-source relationships in
which New York has an interest: those relationships entered or
existing in New York. Since the relationships between deponent
Cohane and certain officials of the San Francisco Giants team
had (by hypothesis) been entered into and existed exclusively in
California, New York would seem to lack an interest in affording
a privileged status to them. There could be another and, I would
suggest, secondary reason for New York's dispositive law containing a newsman's privilege. New York may have determined that
the integrity of its judicial process did not require the availability
as potential evidence of all information secured by newsmen.
Does that reason convert into a significant interest on the part of
New York in having its protective dispositive law applied when
New York is the deposition state? I think the answer is no, for
several reasons. First, that determination of lack of judicial ne65. Id.
66. Some observations about the word "contacts" seem appropriate. First, the contacts presumably should be in addition to the simple fact that New York is the deposition
state. The court's own language corroborates that conclusion. Were the contacts contemplated nothing more than the fact that the forum state was the same as the deposition
state, the phrase, "when the forum (deposition state) has contacts with the cause of
action," would be redundant. Even absent that grammatically compelled conclusion, the
same result would seem to be required by the full faith and credit clause. Ifthe deposition
state qua deposition state were free to disregard the otherwise applicable dispositive law
of a sister state simply because that applicable law differed from that of the deposition
state, the constitutional mandate of the full faith and credit clause would lose a substantial portion of its efficacy. Second, the contacts necessary to justify the use of the
deposition state's dispositive law should be capable of conversion into a legitimate interest
on the part of that state in having its dispositive law applied.
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cessity would go essentially to disclosures arising out of those
newsman-source relationships of primary interest to New York:
those based in New York. Second, even assuming that the determination of lack of judicial necessity would go to disclosures arising out of newsman-source relationships wherever based, it would
not be necessary to apply New York's privilege law where New
York is only the deposition state. To say that the New York
deposition court does not require the purportedly privileged information is not tantamount to deciding that the integrity of the
judicial process would be jeopardized if the information were received. New York's attitude as deposition state presumably
would be that, while the information would be helpful in assuring
the integrity of the judicial process, it is not essential. To receive
the information would simply enhance the integrity of the judicial process beyond that level which New York deems acceptable.
And it should be noted again that New York's concern with the
integrity of its judicial process, in circumstances in which New
York is simply the deposition state, would be wholly assured so
long as the deposition were conducted in a manner consonant
with any orders entered by the New York court, whether those
orders recognized the privilege or compelled disclosure. The court
in the deposition state has no inherent or self-serving purpose for
imposing the New York privilege as to newsman-source relationships existing exclusively in California. Indeed, if the New York
(deposition) court were to apply New York's privilege law to a
relationship existing exclusively in California, the party adversely
affected by that determination would seem to have persuasive
grounds for asserting that the court had violated the due process
clause, by applying the dispositive law of a state having no legitimate interest in the issue thus resolved, and the full faith and
credit clause, by refusing to apply the applicable law of the sister
state.
There is an additional assertion which might be made in an
effort to demonstrate that New York, as deposition state and as
a state having a newsman's privilege statute, has a valid interest
in the application of its privilege law. We have already noted that
the principal reason for such a privilege would be to protect
newsman-source relationships entered and existing in New York.
The purpose of affording such protection would be to facilitate
the flow of information from the (protected) source to the newsman in order to accomplish the ultimate desired end: to assure
the existence of a well-informed public. Since a portion of that
public is in New York, New York may have an interest in apply-
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ing its protective dispositive law as a means of assuring a wellinformed New York public, irrespective of the situs of the
newsman-source relationship. Such an assertion is a rather appealing one. If the New York deposition court were to require the
newsman-deponent to reveal his sources, other sources would
tend to become more circumspect about making revelations to
newsmen, and thus newsmen would have a more limited access
to information. As a result, the New York public, the purported
ultimate beneficiary of the New York privilege law, would tend
to be less well-informed. From New York's perspective, such an
undesirable consequence would ensue both where the newsmansource relationship was sited in New York, and, as well, where the
relationship had existed exclusively in some other state, as for
example, in California. Therefore, hasn't New York a legitimate
interest in the application of its privilege law?
Notwithstanding the immediate appeal of the assertion, I
think the answer should be no. The essence of New York's interest, a well-informed New York citizenry, would be by no means
unique to New York. That same interest could be imputed to any
state having a newsman's privilege, whether or not it happened
to be the deposition state in a particular case. If that were done,
then necessarily, in every case in which a newsman's privilege was
asserted in regard to a nationally distributed publication, the
court would be free to conclude that the privilege should be sustained even though the newsman-source relationship had been
entered into and existed exclusively in a state having no privilege.
That, it seems to me, would usurp from the situs state its legitimate right to determine whether or not such relationships should
be privileged. It would, as well, tend to frustrate the secondary
interest of a sister-forum state having no newsman's privilege in
having available as evidence all information secured by newsmen.
Yet perhaps the one aspect of the assertion which is most troubling (and which is intimately related to the two objections just
noted) is its "nationalization" of the issue. If a newsman's privilege is asserted in regard to a nationally distributed article, and
if, in resolving a choice-of-law problem involving an asserted
newsman's privilege, a court recognizes as a legitimate interest
the desire of each state having such a privilege to secure thereby
a well-informed citizenry, the court would be placed in a position
uncomfortably close to that of a national court (such as the
Supreme Court of the United States) or of a national legislative
body (such as the Congress of the United States). It may well be
that the communications media have become so nationally per-
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vasive that a newsman's privilege asserted in connection with a
nationwide medium should be determined in a manner which
takes into account the interests of all the states of the United
States, most assuredly including those having newsman's privilege statutes. If that is so, the most appropriate organ for generating that law would seem to be the Supreme Court, through constitutional interpretation, or Congress, through enactment of a
newsman's privilege. The Court, however, has not yet demonstrated a willingness to interpret the Constitution in such a way
as to effect a nationwide newsman's privilege;67 nor has Congress,
in enacting the new Federal Rules of Evidence, seen fit to fashion
legislatively a newsman's privilege having nationwide applicability even in federal causes of action." Moreover, in diversity cases,
Congress has explicitly determined that state law should control
privilege issues." Against that background, the decision of a state
court or of a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction and
confronted with a choice-of-law problem as to an asserted newsman's privilege to weigh the interests of all those states having
newsman's privilege statutes would appear to be an arrogation of
political or judicial power. It seems to me to be no less presumptuous for New York to consider its interest in an informed citizenry paramount simply because New York happens to be the
deposition state.
In Cepeda the (New York) federal court, quoting from a New
York state court opinion, asserted: 7"
However much we may desire to assist a sister State, our
courts may not go beyond the statutory powers granted by our
Legislature.
The implication of that excerpted language is that, if New York
had a newsman's privilege statute, its courts would be stripped
of the power to direct a newsman-deponent to answer challenged
questions regardless of where the newsman-source relationship
had existed. Surely that would be an undesirable interpretation
of the statute. The more agreeable construction would be one
which held the courts barred from compelling disclosure of infor67. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
68. FED. R. EVID. 501. The absence of a newsman's privilege was not the result of
legislative oversight. "Much controversy. . . attended the failure to include a newsman's
privilege." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974)

[accompanying H.R. 5463, the FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE].
69. FED. R. EVID. 501.
70. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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mation secured by a newsman from a source in a New York-based
relationship. To impute the broader intention to the legislature
would be to call into question the statute's constitutionality, for
a legislative body, no less than a court, may not impose its legal
conclusions on issues in which the state has no legitimate interest.
We have concluded, therefore, that if the indicative law of
the deposition state refers to the dispositive law of that state
containing a newsman's privilege, when the only contact which
the state has with the case is that it is the deposition state, in
circumstances in which that contact does not convert into a legitimate interest on the part of that state in having its own dispositive law applied, such a choice-of-law resolution would be inept
and constitutionally impermissible. Because of its unconstitutionality, that choice-of-law resolution would be neither binding
upon nor available to a federal district court exercising diversity
jurisdiction (ancillary to that of another federal district trial
court) and sitting in the deposition state. Thus, still assuming
New York to have had a newsman's privilege and California to
have had none, if the federal court in New York in Cepeda had
found that New York's indicative law pointed to New York's dispositive law, application of that dispositive law would have been
constitutionally impermissible, and therefore, neither required
nor permitted by Klaxon.
As a result of those conclusions, the determination of the
(New York) federal court in Cepeda that the choice-of-law problem would be governed by New York's indicative law because of
the applicability of Klaxon must be read in a somewhat restrictive manner. Even to one accepting and advocating the applicability of Klaxon to the second sentence of Rule 501 (as I do), the
classic restriction applicable both to Erie and Klaxon is mandatory: the diversity court is neither required nor permitted to apply
a state-mandated result which would be unconstitutional."
Where the diversity court is confronted with a choice-of-law problem and the state-mandated resolution would result in the application of the dispositive law of a state having no interest in the
issue involved, the diversity court (and a state court sitting in the
state) may not so resolve the issue.
It might be helpful to subject those constitutional conclusions to additional stress. We can do that while still retaining the
71. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
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operative facts of Cepeda by effecting a change of forum. Let's
place the trial before a federal district court sitting in New York
and exercising diversity jurisdiction and have that court direct
that Cohane be deposed in New York before trial. Now New York
is not simply the deposition state; it is the trial state as well. Let
us retain our hypothesis that the newsman-source relationships
between Cohane and team officials of the Giants existed exclusively in California and let's work with the actual state of the law
as it existed in Cepeda: (1) California's dispositive law contains
a potentially applicable newsman's privilege, (2) New York's dispositive law contains no newsman's privilege and (3) New York's
indicative law (as discerned by the federal court in Cepeda) (a)
points to the application of the dispositive law of the trial state
(b) unless the dispositive law of the deposition state contains an
applicable privilege, (c) in which case that dispositive law is to
apply. Since New York is now the trial state (as well as the
deposition state), New York's indicative law would refer to New
York's dispositive law, which contains no applicable privilege.
Does Klaxon require (or permit) the federal court sitting in New
York to reject out of hand the deponent's asserted privilege? If
New York has an appropriate interest in the issue to be resolved,
the answer should be yes. If New York lacks such an interest, the
application of its dispositive law would be constitutionally impermissible, thus neither required nor permitted by Klaxon.
The very fact that New York is the trial state could be said
to give it an interest in the issue presented. New York's dispositive law contains no newsman's privilege. As we noted earlier,
there are two probable reasons for that dispositive law. First, New
York has determined that the newsman-source relationship neither requires nor justifies a privileged status. Presumably, that
New York determination was made with principal concern focused upon such relationships existing in that state. Since, by
hypothesis, the relationships between deponent-newsman and his
sources existed exclusively in California, the primary reason underlying New York's dispositive law does not convert into a New
York interest in having its dispositive law applied. A second and,
I would continue to suggest, secondary reason for New York's
dispositive law containing no newsman's privilege may be a New
York determination that the integrity of its judicial process requires the availability as potential evidence of all information
secured by newsmen. Since New York is the forum, and the integrity of its judicial process is, therefore, necessarily involved, that
reason for New York's dispositive law converts very nicely into a
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New York interest in having its dispositive law (no newsman's
privilege) applied. This will tend to assure the availability of the
information secured by deponent, including the identity of his
sources, to the court sitting in New York. With the availability
of that relevant evidence, the court will have an enhanced assurance that the result achieved in this libel action will be the most
appropriate one attainable.
Were this the usual choice-of-law context, the conclusion
that New York had an interest (albeit secondary) in the issue to
be resolved would provide a satisfactory constitutional basis for
the application of New York's dispositive law. When the forum
finds itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem in which the
forum state and some other state have conflicting dispositive
laws, a determination that the forum has an interest in the issue
to be resolved justifies constitutionally the forum's application of
its own dispositive law, even in circumstances in which some, or
even most, might conclude that a painfully inept choice-of-law
resolution might result.72 While most might conclude that the
other state's interests were clearly superior and, therefore, its
dispositive law should have been utilized, the forum remains con72. See, e.g., Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). See also
WEINTRAUB, supra note 55 where it is stated:
An Illinois guest passenger sued an Illinois host driver for injuries sustained in
Wisconsin on an automobile trip that began and was to end in Illinois. Illinois
had a guest statute requiring "wilful and wanton misconduct" by the host in
order for the guest to recover, while Wisconsin would permit recovery for the
host's ordinary negligence. It was clear that the possible policies underlying the
Illinois guest statute, to protect the Illinois host from the ingratitude of the
Illinois guest and to prevent a collusive suit in order to keep down insurance
rates, were, whether one regards them as silly and benighted or wise and enlightened, fully applicable to the crash in Wisconsin. The Conklin court then proceeded to convince itself that Wisconsin had policies that would be significantly
advanced in this case if the guest was permitted to recover under Wisconsin's
ordinary negligence rule. Wisconsin's policy was that the wrongdoer should bear
the cost of the injury, not the injured party, and not the taxpayers or medical
creditors, if the victim is afforded care for which he cannot pay. Furthermore,
"[t]he deterrent effect that it is hoped our negligence laws exercise upon driver
misconduct will be defeated by allowing negligent misconduct to go unpunished." Then, having decided there was "a serious conflict" between the Illinois
and Wisconsin policies the court went on to resolve this conflict in favor of
Wisconsin's "better law", remarking that "guest statutes are anachronistic."
At the heart of the analysis in Conklin is the court's finding that Wisconsin
had policies that would be significantly defeated if Illinois law were applied-compensation of the injured, protection of taxpayers and medical creditors, and deterrence of negligent driving. It is submitted that Wisconsin had
only an officious and hypothetical interest in applying any of those policies.
Id. at 245-46 (footnotes omitted).
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stitutionally free to determine otherwise and apply its own dispositive law, provided only that the forum state has an interest in
the issue so resolved. And in most choice-of-law contexts, that
broad constitutional latitude available to the forum is probably
acceptable and, arguably, even desirable.
When the choice-of-law problem presented involves an asserted privilege, however, that extensive room for maneuver, generally available to accommodate the forum's view of competing
state interests, seems to me to become undesirable, unacceptable
and, most significantly, unconstitutional. We have already noted
that the Advisory Committee which drafted the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, in support of its conclusion that Erie should
not be deemed applicable to privilege issues in diversity cases,
stated, in part:7 3
The appearance of privilege in the case is quite by accident,
and its effect is to block off the tribunal from a source of information. Thus its real impact is on the method of proof in the
case, and in comparison any substantive impact appears tenuous.
We have seen, too, that the House Judiciary Committee rejected
the conclusion that Erie should not be deemed applicable to privilege issues in diversity cases, finding "that federal law should not
supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege
absent a compelling reason." 4 Like the House Judiciary
Committee, I would reject the Advisory Committee's conclusion
and its supporting rationale excerpted above. Indeed, I would
suggest a directly contrary rationale: because the appearance of
privilege in the case is quite by accident, the real impact of a
judicial determination of the availability of a privilege is on all
of those assertedly privileged relationships of the same class and,
in comparison, any direct litigation result is of limited significance.
It is axiomatic that the number of assertedly privileged relationships requiring a judicial determination of the availability of
the asserted privilege represents only an infinitesimal portion of
the total number of such relationships, whether the area of privilege be that of psychologist-patient, newsman-source, physicianpatient, husband-wife, clergyman-penitent or even attorneyclient. The numbers alone imply the conclusion that the litiga73. PROP. R. EVID. 501, Advisory Comm's Note, as amended.
74. H. COMM. JUD. REP. 9.
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tion impact of such a determination will be substantially less
significant than the impact on all relationships similar to the one
before the court.
More significant than mere numbers, however, is the nature
and extent of the impact on all relationships similar to the one
before the court, bearing in mind that no party to such a relationship can predict with certainty that his relationship will never be
the subject of a judicial determination. How a court reacts to a
privilege asserted in the course of litigation is likely to become
common knowledge within a reasonably short period of time. If
there is an apparent conflict between the judicial reaction and the
dispositive law of the state in which the assertedly privileged
relationship existed, those within that state who are parties to
similar relationships face a dilemma. If the dispositive law of the
situs state protects the relationship by an applicable privilege,
but the judicial determination refused to apply that privilege,
how are parties to similar relationships in that state to respond?
If parties to the relationship continue to rely on the privilege, they
may be adversely affected by a subsequent similar judicial ruling.
If they abjure the privilege and either withdraw from the relationship or remain in it but with declaratory circumspection, they
will simultaneously frustrate the basic right of the situs state to
regulate and protect the relationship, and their own state-based
right to rely on the confidentiality of the relationship, with all of
the adverse effects on the relationship which such reticence will
cause, at least in the view of the situs state which privileged the
communications of the relationship. If the dispositive law of the
situs state contains no privilege, but the judicial determination
affirmatively applies the privilege law of some other state, the
adverse consequences would be nearly as serious. The basic right
of the situs state to control the relationship would be frustrated
and those within that state who are parties to such relationships
might be induced into a reliance on such confidentiality which
may prove to have been misplaced when the same issue is resolved by another court in another case. And in both instances,
those citizens of the situs state would have lost a portion of their
political capacity to determine whether and to what extent such
relationships within that state are to be privileged. Once the existence of the privilege becomes a matter for a judicially
fashioned choice-of-law determination, and the forum is not required to apply the dispositive law of the state in which the relationship was exclusively sited, the certainty of parties to such
relationships within that state as to their privileged status, the
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right of the situs state to regulate such relationships and the
political capacity of citizens of that state to affect its view of the
relationships are all adversely affected. Those concerns seem to
me to be of a magnitude so far greater than the forum's decision
as to the relative need of the information for litigation purposes,
that I believe the forum should be precluded constitutionally
from applying any dispositive law other than that of the state in
which the assertedly privileged relationship existed. Both the due
process and full faith and credit clauses seem meet for the purpose.
Where California is the situs state, a New York forum
(whether a state court or a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction) should be deemed to have no interest, even in the availability of admittedly relevant evidence, sufficient to outweigh the
interest of the situs state. Therefore, the New York forum should
be compelled to apply the California dispositive law. Should the
New York -forum instead apply New York dispositive law, its
choice-of-law determination should be deemed to be without an
appropriate basis of interest and, for that reason, violative of the
due process rights of the party adversely affected thereby and of
the full faith and credit mandate to utilize applicable sister state
law. If those constitutional clauses are utilized as restraints upon
the forum required to resolve a choice-of-law privilege issue, and
if the clauses are deemed to require the forum to apply the dispositive law of the state in which the assertedly privileged relationship exclusively existed, neither the accident of forum nor the
accident of deposition state will adversely affect the expectations
of the parties to the relationship, the right of the situs state to
regulate the relationship or the political capacity of citizens of the
situs state to influence that state's view of the relationship.
Thus, even where New York is the trial state and even where
the forum's interest in securing all potentially relevant evidence
is acknowledged, that interest of the forum state should be
deemed inadequate to justify the forum's nonapplication of the
privilege law of the state where the assertedly privileged
relationship was entered into and exclusively existed, California.
Consequently, a federal district court sitting in New York and
exercising diversity jurisdiction as trial court should (1) recognize
the applicability of Klaxon to the second sentence of Rule 501 and
look to New York's indicative law, but (2) if the court finds that
that indicative law refers to the dispositive law of New York (the
trial state) rather than the dispositive law of California (the exclusive situs of the newsman-source relationship), the court
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should eschew that result as prohibited by the due process and
full faith and credit clauses, and (3) fashion an indicative law
which will lead to the potential application of California's newsman's privilege statute.
Those asserted Klaxon and constitutional conclusions are by
no means intended to be limited to the newsman-source privilege.
They are intended to be applicable to all privilege issues which
arise in federal courts in diversity cases. The emphasis on the
newsman's privilege arose (and was taken advantage of) because
that was the privilege asserted before the federal court in Cepeda.
Both a similar judicial problem and, not surprisingly in view of
the date of the decision, a somewhat similar judicial insensitivity
to the methodology of interest analysis, manifested themselves in
regard to an asserted husband-wife privilege in R. & J. Dick Co.
75

v. Bass.

In Bass, as in Cepeda, separate trial and deposition states
were involved. Plaintiff, R. & J. Dick Co., sued defendants Bass
and Belting, Inc., alleging that they had conspired to damage the
plaintiff's business, and seeking injunctive relief and money damages. The diversity action was brought in a Georgia federal court.
Plaintiff sought to depose "the estranged (though not divorced)
wife of defendant Bass, presumably for the purpose of establishing the alleged conspiratorial negotiations between Bass and
Habegger [controlling party of Belting, Inc.],"76 with the deposi77
tion to be taken in Pennsylvania, deponent's state of residence.
Defendants objected to the deposition on the basis of a
Pennsylvania statute which "appears on its face to absolutely
prohibit husband and wife [from] testifying against each other
in civil cases.

78

"Georgia law, on the other hand, contains no

75. 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
76. Id. at 760.
77. Id.
78. Id. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 317 (1887) provides:
Nor shall husband and wife be competent or permitted to testify against
each other, except in proceedings brought by a wife to be declared a feme sole
trader, and except also in those proceedings for divorce in which personal service
of the subpoena or of a rule to take depositions has been made upon the opposite
party, or in which the opposite party appears and defends, in which case either
may testify fully against the other, and except also that in any proceeding for
divorce either party may be called merely to prove the fact of marriage.
In addition, Pennsylvania has a statute prohibiting disclosure of interspousal confidential communications:
Nor shall either husband or wife be competent or permitted to testify to
confidential communications made by one to the other, unless this privilege be
waived upon the trial.
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such absolute prohibition as the Pennsylvania statute . . .re-

confidential communications between
ferred to, but does exclude
79
husband and wife.
The defendants' objection was directed to the Georgia federal
trial court. "Initially, [because] Georgia [had] no objection to
the deposition, and because it was to be taken in Pennsylvania,
the court was tempted to defer to the Pennsylvania courts and let
them decide whether the taking of the deposition was permissible
under their law.""0 Because the question was raised in Georgia,
however, "the court . . . reluctantly concluded it should decide
it."81 Acknowledging that the admissibility of evidence is gov-

erned by the law of the forum state and "that matters of privilege
and competency are ordinarily considered as being substantive
within the meaning of Erie," 2 the court decided which law to
3
apply in the following manner:
Id. § 316.
And a statute prohibiting one spouse from testifying against the other in criminal
proceedings:
Nor shall husband and wife be competent or permitted to testify against
each other, or in support of a criminal charge of adultery alleged to have been
committed by or with the other, except that in proceedings for desertion and
maintenance, and in any criminal proceeding against either for bodily injury or
violence attempted, done or threatened upon the other, or upon the minor
children of said husband and wife, or the minor children of either of them, or
any minor child in their care or custody, or in the care or custody of either of
them, each shall be a competent witness against the other, and except also that
either of them shall be competent merely to prove the fact of marriage, in
support of a criminal charge of adultery or bigamy alleged to have been committed by or with the other.
Id. tit. 19, § 683.
79. R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1968). GA. CODs ANN. § 38418 (1959) provides:
There are certain admissions and communications excluded from consideration
of public policy.
Among these are:
1. Communications between husband and wife ....
80. R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758, 760 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 760-62 (footnote omitted). The lengthy excerpt from the court's opinion is
quoted in the text to demonstrate the agonizing judicial scrutiny of the conflict between
trial state and deposition state-even after a determination of the applicability of Erie
and Klax6n-with little judicial recognition of the underlying basis for the Pennsylvania
dispositive law: preservation of the marital status. Ultimately, the court permitted the
taking of the deposition of Mrs. Bass, noting, in part:
[Tihere are many matters as to which the wife may be examined without being
called upon to testify "against" her husband. It is obvious that she is acquainted
with the Swiss manufacturer, Habegger. She may very well have had conversa-
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All this would seem to indicate that Georgia law controls;
and so it must-but the situation here may very well be one
where Georgia courts themselves would apply the law of Pennsylvania. For example, the Pennsylvania competency statute
previously mentioned does not merely establish a rule of evidence; rather it announces a deeply ingrained public policy of
that State; and while ordinarily a deposition state would defer
to the forum state on a question of evidence, it is not required
to do so (and probably would not) where its public policy would
be offended thereby. See Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th
Cir., 1955), cert. denied 351 U.S. 965

.

. .;

Ex Parte Sparrow,

14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala., 1953). Georgia recognizes this rule,
and if the situation were reversed (that is, if a Pennsylvania
court was seeking a deposition in Georgia which offended the
public policy of Georgia), it is very doubtful whether Georgia
would permit the deposition to be taken. Ga. Code Ann. § 102110; Ulman, Magill & Jordan Woolen Co., Inc. v. Magill, 155
Ga. 555, 117 S.E. 657 (1923).
The question then is one of comity. Shall this court, bound
as it is by the Georgia rule as to conflict of laws, nevertheless
honor the public policy of Pennsylvania; and if so, may the
deposition be taken under Pennsylvania law? Although the
question seems to be one of first impression in Georgia, the court
concludes that on the very narrow question of whether the deposition shall be taken, Pennsylvania law should control, and that,
if called upon to decide the question, the Georgia court would
so hold. The court reaches this conclusion for several reasons:
First, the court arrives at this result as a matter of practical
necessity, for here the witness resides in Pennsylvania, and if a
Pennsylvania court would prohibit her deposition, certainly neither the Georgia courts nor this court could compel it to be
taken. Second, the Pennsylvania privilege, embodying the public policy of that state, relates to a matter of substance, not of
form, and on such a matter Pennsylvania law would be given
controlling effect in Georgia. The transaction here in contemplation is, of course, the taking of a deposition, and on this subject
Georgia law provides that:
"Matters of substance or right, and those of procedure
or remedy are to be distinguished. The former are to be
tions with him which would exonerate her husband and implicate Habegger or
his subsidiary, Belting, Incorporated.
Id. at 763. The likelihood that Mrs. Bass' testimony would tend to "exonerate" Mr. Bass
seems extraordinarily slim, bearing in mind that her deposition was sought by the adverse
party and, in the words of the court, "presumably for the purpose of establishing the
alleged conspiratorial negotiations between Bass and Habegger." Id. at 760.
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controlled by the law of the place of the transactionwhile
the latter are controlled by that of the forum." 5 Encyclopedia of Georgia Law, "Conflict of Laws", § 21. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Again, bearing in mind that the "transaction" in question is the
taking of the deposition, Pennsylvania becomes the forum state,
and its law would apply whether the question be regarded as
substantive or procedural.
Finally, the conclusion that Pennsylvania law should control seems to represent the better reasoning in those cases from
other states which have considered the general question:
"* * * [W]here a deposition is being taken in a state
whose declared public policy has carved out a privilege in
favor of a certain class of communication, a federal court
sitting in that state will apply that pronounced public policy to questions propounded on a deposition of an out-ofstate suit, even though the trial state does not recognize
the privilege." Application of Cepeda, supra, 233 F. Supp.
at 469.
As in Cepeda, the language of the court in Bass has the
surface appeal of suggesting that, despite trial in one state and
deposition in another, a potentially applicable privilege will not
be lost in transit. But, as in Cepeda, the opinion in Bass seems
to overlook the essence of the interests of the two states in the
choice-of-law problem presented, an oversight probably explicable again in terms of the date of the opinion and the relatively
recent judicial acceptance of interest analysis.
In Bass, as in Cepeda, the "competing" jurisdictions are
identified as trial state and deposition state. While those characterizations are factually accurate, they are less helpful than a
characterization based on the state of marital domicile. Presumably, the reason for Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting husband
and wife from testifying against each other in civil cases was
Pennsylvania's conclusion that to permit one spouse to testify
against the other would generate interspousal animosity and thus
threaten the marital relationship. 4 Pennsylvania's interest in
84. Closely allied to the disqualification of parties, and even more arbitrary
and misguided, was the early common law disqualification of the husband or
wife of the party. This disqualification prevented the party's husband or wife
from testifying either for or against the party in any case, civil or criminal.
Doubtless we should classify the disability of the husband or wife as a witness
to testify for the party-spouse as a disqualification, based upon the supposed
infirmity of interest, and the rule enabling the party-spouse to prevent the
husband or wife from testifying against the party as a privilege.
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preserving the marital status is most significant in those instances in which the marital domicile is in Pennsylvania. Had the
Bass marital domicile been in Georgia, or any state other than
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania's interest in the application of its

statute would have been insignificant, notwithstanding the fact
that Pennsylvania was the deposition state. The focus of the Bass

court's attention, therefore, should have been on the state of marital domicile, not on the competing interests of a trial state versus
a deposition state. Unfortunately, the court's opinion does not
precisely identify the marital domicile and a determination of the
situs of the marriage in Bass is complicated by the fact that

deponent and defendant were estranged. The estrangement raises
this preliminary question: does the Pennsylvania interest in pre-

serving the marital status by prohibiting one spouse from testifying against the other exist when the spouses are living separate
and apart? The answer apparently provided by Pennsylvania
decisions is yes; so long as reconciliation seems feasible, Pennsyl-

vania's interest in preserving the marriage exists." Now the
principal question: with the spouses separated, and Mrs. Bass
residing in Pennsylvania, does the Pennsylvania interest in pre-

serving the marital status apply? Presumably, that question too
should be answered in the affirmative, even if Mr. Bass resided

in some state other than Pennsylvania. Given the long judicially
recognized interest of each state in the marital status of its own

domiciliaries, 5 it seems appropriate to conclude that, so long as
C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 66, at 144 (2d ed. Cleary 1972) (footnotes omitted).
Thus, while the Pennsylvania statute states that neither spouse shall be "competent," since the prohibition applies only to testifying "against" the other spouse, it is clear
that the legislative purpose was not to create "the early common law disqualification"
based on interest, but, rather, a privilege intended to preserve the marriage.
85. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 939 (1964). In affirming the conviction of husband-defendant of the second-degree
murder of his adult son, the court concluded that receipt in evidence of inculpatory letters
written by defendant to his apparent paramour and accidentally discovered by his estranged wife, who gave them to the mortician, who, in turn, gave them to the police, did
not violate the husband-wife privilege because wife had neither testified against husband
nor secured the letters through confidential interspousal communications. Obviously, if
estrangement alone terminated the privilege, there would have been no need for the
court's rationale. The statute involved in Wilkes, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683 (1887),
prohibited one spouse from testifying against the other in criminal proceedings. Given the
enhanced state interest in criminal prosecutions, the court's tacit conclusion that separation does not terminate the marital privilege assumes an a fortiori application to civil
proceedings.
86. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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Mrs. Bass is domiciled in Pennsylvania, that state's interest in
preserving her marital status by prohibiting her from testifying
against her husband remains significant.
Georgia's interest in the Bass litigation also deserves analysis. As trial state desirous of preserving the integrity of its judicial
process, Georgia has the interest of assuring that all potentially
relevant evidence is available. The asserted privilege, if recognized, would serve to deny potentially relevant evidence to the
forum, thus undermining Georgia's interest in assuring the full
availability of evidence. As noted earlier,87 in most choice-of-law
contexts, simultaneous conclusions that the legal issue presented
has the capacity of frustrating the integrity of the judicial process
and that the forum's dispositive law does not permit such
frustration would provide the forum with a legitimate interest in
the issue presented and enable the forum constitutionally to
apply its own dispositive law. Were the issue one not related to
an asserted privilege, the application of Georgia's dispositive law
would be entirely acceptable. Because, however, the issue arises
directly out of an asserted privilege, greater circumspection on
the part of the forum seems desirable and, I would suggest, constitutionally compelled.
Pennsylvania, the state of domicile of one of the parties to
the protected relationship (the marriage), has concluded that
preservation of that relationship is so critically important that
neither spouse should be permitted to testify against the other.
Were Georgia dispositive law, rather than Pennsylvania dispositive law, applied, that significant interest of the state of marital
domicile (or, at least, the domicile of one of the parties to the
marriage) would be frustrated. It is true that Georgia's law prohibits one spouse from testifying to confidential communications
made by the other, and presumably for a similar purpose: to
facilitate interspousal communications thus to preserve the marital status; 8 but that privilege is not as broad and, therefore, not
as protective as the Pennsylvania privilege. As the domicile of one
of the spouses, Pennsylvania's concern with preserving the marital status transcends any single litigation. Whatever the outcome
87. See notes 40-58 supra and accompanying text.
88. [C]ommunications between husband and wife are protected forever.
This is necesssary to the preservation of that perfect confidence and trust which
should characterize and bless the relation of man and wife. Each must feel that
the other is a safe and sound depository of all secrets.
Lingo v. State, 29 Ga. 470, 483 (1859).
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of the Bass case, Pennsylvania wants to preserve the Bass marriage. Whatever the economic impact of any judgment ultimately
entered in the Bass case, that impact will be less significant than
Pennsylvania's continuing desire to preserve the Bass marriage,
with all of the ongoing personal, social and economic consequences such preservation would imply. Therefore, the conceded
interest of Georgia (the forum) should be deemed insufficient to
justify the nonapplication of that marriage-protective law of
Pennsylvania which prohibits one spouse from testifying against
the other. In my opinion, the concern of the state of the marital
status in attempting to preserve that status is more significant
than the limited and transitory concern of the forum in securing
all potentially relevant evidence, and the protection of the more
significant interest should be assured by determining that the
nonapplication of Pennsylvania's protective dispositive law is not
only undesirable but unconstitutional as well. If the interest of
the state of marital domicile is recognized as being so significant
that no other state as forum, even with the forum's conceded
interest in preserving the integrity of its own judicial process, has
a sufficient interest in the application of its own dispositive law,
then nonapplication of the dispositive law of the marital domicile
in favor of the application of the dispositive law of the forum
would be deemed violative of both the due process and full faith
and credit clauses of the Constitution. That constitutional assurance that the dispositive law of the situs of the protected relationship will be applied is both desirable and justified. It alone provides assurance that the rights of the parties to the relationship,
the interest of the situs state in regulating the relationship and
the political capacity of citizens of the situs state to affect that
state's view of such relationships will be preserved, despite the
accident of forum. Additionally, it alone assures recognition of
the greater significance which attaches to all such relationsips
than to an evidentiary ruling on admissibility in a particular trial.
Therefore, the (Georgia) federal district court should have concluded that Klaxon was applicable to the choice-of-law problem
presented in Bass but that a Georgia indicative law pointing to
the nonapplication of Pennsylvania's protective dispositive law
would have been constitutionally impermissible.
Let's take a factual liberty with Bass89 and assume that Mr.
89. The court's opinion states that Mrs. Bass was a Pennsylvania resident, but makes
no explicit mention of Mr. Bass' state of residence.
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Bass was a Georgia domiciliary (making Georgia the forum and
domicile state of one of the parties to the marital relationship).
Under such circumstances, would it be constitutionally permissible for a Georgia federal district court to conclude that Klaxon
required the utilization of Georgia's indicative law, which pointed
to the application of Georgia dispositive law, and thereby precluded the application of the more protective dispositive law of
Pennsylvania?
Where the parties to an existing marriage are separated and
each is domiciled in a different state, presumably each state's
interest in the marital status of its domiciliary is precisely equal
to that of the other state." Given that equilibrium of interests,
and bearing in mind that the privilege laws of the two states are
different, there is a certain temptation to conclude that, if the
indicative law of the forum-domicile refers to that state's dispositive law, that dispositive law should be deemed constitutionally
available to the federal diversity court through Klaxon.
Ideally, it seems to me, the temptation should be resisted
through judicial restraint. That is, I would hope that the highest
appellate court of Georgia, confronted with such a choice-of-law
problem, would conclude that, even assuming the constitutional
propriety of the application of Georgia's less protective law and
even recognizing the interest of Georgia as forum in the potentially relevant (nonconfidential communication) testimony of
Mrs. Bass when offered against Mr. Bass, that court would simultaneously recognize Pennsylvania's interest in preserving the
marital status of its domiciliary (on a par with Georgia's similar
interest) and conclude that comity compelled the application of
the more protective Pennsylvania law. If that were the reaction
of the Supreme Court of Georgia, a federal court sitting in Georgia and confronted with Bass could simply follow the mandate of
Klaxon and avoid any constitutional complications. But both the
possibility of a different reaction from the Supreme Court of
Georgia and a personal sense of obligation to pursue the constitutional issue to its conclusion impel me to confront and attempt
to resolve that constitutional problem.
The constitutional problem raised by changing the facts in
Bass arises with respect to the newsman-source privilege asserted
in Cepeda, if certain facts are altered for the sake of discussion.
90. See Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v, North
Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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If the relationships between Cohane and San Francisco Giants
team officials had been initiated in California but pursued in
New York, would it have been constitutionally permissible for the
federal district court in New York to conclude that (1) Klaxon
pointed to New York's indicative law, (2) New York's indicative
law referred to New York's dispositive law, (3) New York's dispositive law contained no newsman's privilege, and therefore, (4)
Cohane's assertion of the California newsman's privilege should
be rejected summarily? That admittedly difficult question may
be approached by attempting to resolve some relatively easier
and alternately subsumed factual situations.
If California remained the basic and almost exclusive situs
of the newsman-source relationships, the earlier conclusion that
summary rejection of the California newsman's privilege would
be constitutionally impermissible would appear to be continuingly appropriate. The significant interests of the parties to the
relationships, the situs state and citizens of that state would be
virtually unchanged. Preservation of the integrity of the
California-based newsman-source relationship would clearly outweigh preservation of New York's forum-based interest in securing potentially relevant evidence. If, on the other hand, the New
York relationships were as substantial as the California relationships, and the information revealed in each state was easily severable, it would seem perfectly appropriate to require the application of California dispositive law to the California-based relationships and to permit the application of New York dispositive law
to the New York-based relationships. Application of New York's
dispositive law to that severable portion of the relationship which
existed in New York would do no violence to the expectations of
the parties who volitionally entered the relationships in New York
and would be wholly consistent with permitting the situs state
(New York) to regulate the relationships and its citizens to affect
politically the mode of regulation.
Suppose, however, that the relationships existed substantially in both states and the revelations made by sources to
newsmen were totally inseparable. Which state's law should determine the asserted privilege? Since the parties to the relationships volitionally carried into New York the relationships initiated in California, none could assert successfully that his expectation of privilege would be unduly frustrated by a determination
that New York's dispositive law (no newsman's privilege) applied. Such a result would be wholly consonant with what the
parties should have contemplated; no well-based reliance on the
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California privilege could be assigned to that substantial portion
of the continuing relationships which existed in New York. New
York's interest in regulating the relationships would be as significant as the analogous California interest and the political capacity of New York citizens to affect the mode of control would be
as significant as the analogous interest of California citizens.
Therefore, application of New York dispositive law would be entirely appropriate and certainly constitutionally permissible.
Consequently, if that were the result which the New York Court
of Appeals would achieve, that result would be binding through
Klaxon on a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction in New
York.
Does such reasoning imply that, given a Pennsylvania domicile for Mrs. Bass, a Georgia domicile for Mr. Bass and a Georgia
forum, Georgia should be free to apply its less protective dispositive law and compel Mrs. Bass to testify against Mr. Bass? I think
not.
It is true, of course, that the state of domicile of each of the
spouses is deemed to have jurisdiction to hear and determine a
divorce action brought by its own domiciliary.9 ' Indeed, that jurisdiction grows out of the interest which each state has in the
marital status of its domiciled spouse." So long as the divorceaction plaintiff is a bona fide domiciliary of the forum state, that
state's court may hear and determine the action, and, if a divorce
is granted, that decree will be entitled to full faith and credit
recognition in all sister states, including the domicile state of the
other spouse. 3
In Bass, however, neither state was asked to assert its jurisdiction to hear and determine an action to terminate the marriage. Rather, each state presented a dispositive law intended to
preserve the marital status. That distinguishes Bass not only
from a divorce proceeding but also from the newsman-source situ91. See Williams v. North Carolina (H1),325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942).
92. See Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 229.30 (1945); Williams v.
North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1942).
93. See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945); Williams v.
North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1942). Of course, absent personal service of
process upon, or the entry of a general appearance by, defendant, the court's decree of
permanent alimony will not be binding on a nonresident defendant. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). For suggestions that divorce
actions be deemed transitory and, therefore, cognizable in any forum, and that the totality
of the forum's decree be given full faith and credit see Seidelson, Interest Analysis and
DivorceActions, 21 BuFF. L. Rav. 315 (1972).
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ations discussed above. In the "newsman-source" cases only one
state had a dispositive law intended to protect the relationship;
the other state's law offered no protection. In Bass both Georgia
and Pennsylvania had dispositive laws prohibiting disclosure and
intended to protect the relationship. It was to serve that interest
that Georgia prohibited either spouse from testifying to confidential communications between the spouses, and Pennsylvania prohibited either spouse from testifying against the other (in addition to prohibiting testimonial revelations of confidential interspousal communications). Both states (each the domicile of one
of the spouses, given our hypothesis that Mr. Bass was a Georgia
domiciliary) wished to preserve the relationship but each had its
own view of the better means of achieving that goal. Of the two
views, Pennsylvania's was the more protective. Application of
that more protective Pennsylvania dispositive law prohibiting
either spouse from testifying against the other would do nothing
to frustrate Georgia's discerned interest in preserving the marriage. On the other hand, application of Georgia's dispositive law
prohibiting only the revelation of confidential communications
but otherwise permitting one spouse to testify against the other
would clearly frustrate the interest in preserving the marriage as
perceived by Pennsylvania. Georgia's other interest, that of the
forum in securing potentially relevant evidence, is, it seems to
me, patently of only secondary significance when compared with
the basic interest of both states in preserving the marital status.
There is a second relevant distinction between the newsmansource relationship and the marital status cases. That difference
is evidenced by the ease with which newsman and source can
eliminate or substantially reduce the interest of the original situs
of the relationship simply by continuing the relationship in another state, while still retaining their original domiciles. Neither
party to a marriage has the capacity to eliminate or even substantially reduce the interest of his or her domicile state in preserving
the marital status simply by effecting a temporary change in
locale. In fact, even if both parties to the marriage were to leave
the marital domicile only temporarily, they would not eliminate
or diminish the domicile state's interest in preserving the marital
relationship. And, as we have noted, that interest would subsist
even if one of the spouses (but not the other) were to acquire a
new bona fide domicile of choice. Each state's interest in preserving the marital status of its domiciliary is "deeply ingrained"'94
94. See R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758, 761 (N.D. Ga. 1968).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 3

Ho/stra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1976]

because of the basic and significant personal, social and economic
consequences affiliated with the marital relationship.
Taking into account that in Bass both states were interested
primarily in preserving the marital relationship and that preservation of that relationship is of unique significance to each of the
spouses' domicile states, I would suggest that the rejection of
Pennsylvania's dispositive law intended to preserve the marital
status of one of its own domiciliaries in favor of the less protective
Georgia dispositive law having a similar purpose, would not be
justified in terms of any appropriate countervailing Georgia interest. Where each state is the domicile of one of the spouses, each
state's interest in the marital status (as manifested by the state's
dispositive law) is one of preservation, the dispositive law of one
of the interested states is more protective in that regard than the
other state's, and the application of that more protective law will
not frustrate the basic protective interest of the other state, the
forum should be required to apply that more protective dispositive law. In that manner, the primary interest of each domicile
state would be served and neither state's protective interest
would be frustrated. Where the domicile state having the less
protective dispositive law is also the forum, its secondary interest
as forum in securing all potentially relevant evidence should not
be deemed to be of sufficient significance to justify nonapplication of the other state's more protective law. If the due process
and full faith and credit clauses are read as compelling that result, neither a litigant's choice of forum nor a forum's designation
of the most convenient deposition state will have the capacity of
exposing the protected relationship to the vulnerability of diminished protection. Consequently, still assuming that Mrs. Bass
was a Pennsylvania domiciliary and Mr. Bass a Georgia domiciliary, the federal court in Georgia should have concluded that, in
that diversity case: (1) Klaxon applied, so that Georgia indicative
law was applicable; but (2) if that Georgia indicative law referred
to Georgia dispositive law, rather than the dispositive law of
Pennsylvania; (3) it produced a result precluded by the due process and full faith and credit clauses; therefore (4) that result was
neither binding upon nor available to the federal court, so (5)
Pennsylvania's dispositive law applied.
Both Cepeda and Bass presented the litigation phenomenon
of different trial and deposition states and, for that reason, served
as uniquely appropriate vehicles for an examination of the applicability of Klaxon and potential constitutional inhibitions on a
purely mechanical Klaxon-produced result. When a diversity
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court is confronted with different trial and deposition states, the
judicial process of determining which state's indicative law is
applicable and why tends to be relatively exposed and, therefore,
available for analysis. But it should not be assumed that the
applicability of Klaxon or those potential constitutional inhibitions come into play only in those diversity cases involving different trial and deposition states; each is equally critical in those
diversity cases in which the totality of the litigation process occurs in one state. We can demonstrate that-and simultaneously
come full cycle-by returning to our original psychologist-patient
hypothetical, with one legal distinction.
Let's assume that State A, site of the two-vehicle collision
and forum state, has rejected interest analysis and determined to
retain lex loci delicti as its indicative law in tort cases."s When
the diversity court, confronted with the challenged testimony of
the psychologist who interviewed P at the rehabilitation center in
State B, examines State A's indicative law, as Klaxon requires,
it finds that the highest appellate court of that state would apply
the dispositive law of State A (no psychologist-patient privilege)
and receive the offered testimony. Is that result constitutionally
permissible?
Let's indulge in the assumption that, although the result is
simply the mechanical product of State A's indicative law (lex
loci delicti) and Klaxon, when its constitutional propriety is
challenged the result will enjoy the benefit of any appropriate
basis of interest. The most apparent interest of State A in the
application of its own dispositive law (no privilege) is that of the
forum in preserving the integrity of its judicial process by securing all potentially relevant evidence."5
95. SCOLES & WEINTRAUB, supra note 54, at 487, list ten states which have achieved
that judicial determination, with appropriate citations. For a suggestion that one of those
decisions, Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969), may have violated the due process clause see Seidelson, Interest Analysis: For Those Who Like It and
Those Who Don't, 11 DuQ. L. REv. 283 (1973).
96. That raises a subsidiary question to which, so far, we have supplied a tacit
affirmative answer. Is the forum-based interest of State A relevant when trial is in a
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction and sitting in State A? Arguably, State A's
interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial process, and the State A dispositive law
intended to serve that interest, are wholly irrelevant when the court is a federal one and,
therefore, beyond the state's interest in preserving (state) court integrity and beyond the
state's sovereign reach, whether the dispositive law of the state be legislative or judicial.
The argument is overcome, I think, by two considerations. First, since the case is statebased (hence, the diversity jurisdiction) and does not involve a federal cause, there may
indeed be a continuing state interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process
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Does that interest, attributable to State A and the diversity
court sitting in that state, provide an appropriate justification for
the nonapplication of State B's dispositive law containing a
psychologist-patient privilege? The relationship existed exclusively in State B where the interview occurred and the rehabilitation process was effected. To the extent that the parties to the
relationship contemplated the application of any law to that relationship, presumably they contemplated the application of State
B's protective dispositive law. As the exclusive situs of the relationship, State B has a unique interest in regulating that relationship (in this case, by protecting it and thereby encouraging those
within the state to enter such relationships without declaratory
circumspection, thus enhancing the efficacy of those relationships). Those most interested in determining that mode of regulation and having some political capacity to affect it, are the citizens of State B. Each of those basic interests would be frustrated
by the application of State A's dispositive law. While State A has
an interest in the application of its dispositive law (to secure
potentially relevant evidence), that purely litigation-based interest seems to me to lack sufficient significance to justify the nonapplication of State B's protective dispositive law. Therefore, I
believe, the due process and full faith and credit clauses should
be deemed to preclude the nonapplication of State B's dispositive
law. Consequently, in this diversity case, the federal court should
recognize the applicability of Klaxon to the second sentence of
Rule 501 and look to the indicative law of State A. However, when
the court finds (as I think it should) that State A's indicative law
refers to State A's dispositive law in circumstances where State
A lacks an appropriate interest to justify the nonapplication of
State B's dispositive law, the court should conclude that that
result is constitutionally impermissible, and therefore, neither
of the state which will hear and resolve the case. Second, Congress seems to have acquiesced, at least impliedly, in having that state interest reach diversity cases in federal
courts. As we have seen, the HousE JumIcL RY COMMrITEE REPORT (pages 8-9) in having
Erie apply to privilege issues in diversity cases, offered, as one reason, a desire to discourage forum shopping as between state and federal courts. Were the state interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial process deemed inapplicable to diversity cases, the competing interests of forum state and sister state could be affected substantially by counsel's
selection of a state or federal court. Since affecting those interests could influence the
resolution of all choice-of-law problems in the case, counsel on either side would have an
incentive for preferring one of the two available courts. That would frustrate the legislative
intent manifested in the Committee's report. Therefore, it should be concluded that State
A's interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial process is relevant in this diversity
court.
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binding upon nor available to the court through Klaxon. Thus,
the court should apply the dispositive law of State B and reject
the offered testimony of the psychologist.
The explicit language of Rule 501 requires that a federal
court exercising diversity jurisdiction is to resolve privilege issues
by the application of state law. The House Judiciary Committee
Report implies strongly that, confronted with a choice-of-law
problem as to a privilege issue, the diversity court is to resolve
the choice-of-law problem as it would be resolved by the highest
appellate court of the state in which the diversity court sits; in
other words, Klaxon is applicable. As we have seen, however, a
purely mechanical application of Klaxon could produce results
which are antithetical to the very essence of and reason for the
privilege, and thus vulnerable to successful attack as being violative of the due process or full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Those potential constitutional impediments to a purely
mechanical application of Klaxon, each requiring careful judicial
analysis in each individual case, may explain why the House
Judiciary Committee did not explicitly mandate the application
of Klaxon.97 They also suggest that federal courts hearing diversity cases and finding themselves confronted with choice-of-law
privilege issues should, simultaneously, recognize the applicability of Klaxon but remain sensitive to the possibility that the
choice-of-law resolution which might be achieved by the highest
appellate state court could, in the absence of significant countervailing interests, unduly intrude upon an applicable privilege,
and, for that reason, be unconstitutional, thus neither binding
upon nor available to the diversity court.
97. Congress seems to have followed the lead of the Advisory Committee in avoiding
the codification of constitutional principles, probably a wise decision both for the drafters
and the enactors of the rules of evidence. "No attempt is made in these rules to incorporate
the constitutional provisions which relate to the admission and exclusion of evidence,
whether denominated as privilege or not." PROP. R. EVID. 501, Advisory Comm's Note.
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